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Book review
Review of Vjatsheslav Zilanov, Mister 
Russland Arktis? (Россия теряет 
Арктику?)
Vjatsheslav Zilanov. Mister Russland Arktis? Translated from Russian to Norwe-
gian by Svetlana Petrovna Jakobsen and Reidar Jakobsen. Oslo: Vidarforlaget AS. 
2018. 281 pages. ISBN: 9788279902867. (Originally published as Россия теряет 
Арктику? in 2013.)
Reviewed by Gunnar Nerdrum, retired Norwegian Supreme Court attorney, former 
member of the Paris Bar and the Moscow Bar.
This book merits interest, particularly by Norwegians, since it principally deals with 
Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic oceans. 
Born in 1938, Vjatsheslav Zilanov participated on and often led the teams from 
the Soviet Union and later (from 1991) the Russian Federation negotiating fisheries 
issues with Norway. He started his career in 1957 on a research vessel and since then 
has published nine books and more than 300 scientific articles on various subjects 
related to high-seas fishing. He has held posts as vice-minister for fisheries and is 
currently a member of different groups of experts dealing with questions related to 
fisheries and the exploitation of valuable organisms in the oceans. He is considered 
a leading specialist on issues related to the sustainable exploitation of the wealth of 
the seas.
In this book Zilanov gives snapshots from the negotiations in which he took part 
from 1973 and onwards. Of particular interest for Norwegians are his recollections 
and appreciation of the main Norwegian negotiators at that time, Jens Evensen and 
Arne Treholt. 
The negotiations in the 1970s finally led to the “grey zone” agreement (gråsoneavtalen) 
of 1978. While heavily criticised in Norway it was expressly renewed annually and had 
the merit of establishing an agreed delimitation in parts of the disputed area at sea.
Zilanov deviates from this account to comment on the delimitation agreement 
in the Bering Sea between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1990. He 
characterizes that agreement as a “traitors’ agreement” between the two countries’ 
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respective secretaries of state at that time, Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker. 
The agreement was immediately ratified by the competent U.S. bodies but has yet 
to be ratified on the Russian side, although it has been provisionally applied by both 
parties since then.
Zilanov was not on the negotiating team that concluded the Barents Sea Treaty 
between Russia and Norway in 2010. That treaty established a delimitation line that 
is placed almost in the middle between the pretentions of the two countries. Zilanov 
however saw no reason to “give” the Norwegians some 80,000 km2 of the seabed 
and water column. The first edition of this book had the significant title The Failure 
of the President in the Barents Sea (Баренцеморская ошибка Президента). He believes 
the agreement detracts from the Russian positions with respect to:
1. Loss of fish-catching territories in the Western Barents Sea
2.  Weakening Russia’s arguments as against for the Norwegian Fish Protection 
Zone around Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
As for the first objection, there is a system of reciprocal supervision of the fish 
catches. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission meets once a year and 
has done so since 1975. It makes decisions on the total fish catches, divided into 
different species, with allocation to the two countries, as well as quotas for fishing 
boats from other countries. On the whole, this system has been working well despite 
fluctuations in the diplomatic climate between the two countries.
As for the second objection, it is correct that Norway in 1977 established a 
“non-discriminating fishing protection zone” of 200 miles around Svalbard. Russia 
has not recognized this zone, nor have most other countries. But it works. One rea-
son for this is, perhaps, that Norway has always granted quite generous quotas to 
fishing boats from other nations. In return, these boats are obliged to follow Norwe-
gian rules and accept Norwegian jurisdiction.
Many foreign actors have contested the regime before Norwegian courts, and sev-
eral cases have also been heard before the Norwegian Supreme Court. However, the 
judges have always found it possible to avoid taking a position on the crucial ques-
tion, namely: does Norway have a unilateral right to pronounce such a zone in waters 
that have been considered “international” by others until now?
Zilanov is particularly upset by the fact that the Norwegian Coast Guard patrols 
the fish protection zone and arrests Russian (and other) vessels and escorts them to 
a harbour in the mainland of Norway. Thus, the vessels are prevented from fishing 
while under arrest. He reports rather shocking scenes, in particular when the Russian 
trawler Elektron some years ago fled from the Norwegian inspection vessel, with some 
of the Norwegian controllers on board, and returned to undisputed Russian waters.
A “Norwegian threat”? It is strange to see in Zilanov’s account that little Norway 
may be considered a threat to a super-power such as the Russian Federation, as we 
in Norway have always focussed on with the “Russian threat”. The “Russian bear” is 
presumed to be greedy for the land and the ice-free harbours of Finnmark. However, 
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as professor Jens Petter Nielsen has demonstrated, there has never been any reality 
to these suppositions1.
On the other hand, we have seen historically in Russia warnings of a perceived 
“threat” from Norway. This has primarily been based upon the partly doubtful expe-
riences after the Norwegian colonisation from the 1860s on the Murmansk Coast. 
In fact, the czarist administration encouraged this immigration. They looked at the 
prosperity in the adjacent Finnmark communities and thought that hard-working 
Norwegians would serve as a good example to the Russians. Russian authorities 
granted the colonists substantial privileges, including the right to sell liquor, which 
turned out to have deplorable consequences for the Sami, Finish and Russian pop-
ulation. Thus the argument arose: Why should these newcomers have rights that we 
Russians deny our own kinsmen?
Norwegian hunters in the Arctic also had real advantages. As their Russian 
competitors were blocked by the ice in the White Sea up to the end of May, the 
Norwegians benefited from the Gulf Stream, either up to Svalbard or eastwards to 
Novaya Zemlya. So, when finally, the Russian hunters came to the sealing fields, the 
Norwegians had already been hunting there for quite a time. 
There was even a fear within leading circles in Russia that this might provide a 
basis for claims on annexations of land. To protect the country against this calamity, 
some Nenets families were transported to settle on Novaya Zemlya. This island was 
a thriving community by the 1920s when Vsevolod Vasnetsov visited it many times 
as part of research teams on the legendary “Persei”.2
In recent years a threat has also been felt in the military field. Norway is a member 
of NATO, which considers the R.F. its main “enemy”. In the past, the Norwegian 
Government made many decisions to reassure Russia. For instance, it did not allow 
joint allied exercises in Finnmark, the county adjacent to the Kola Peninsula. Now 
these restrictions have been lifted. Americans train with other NATO forces close to 
the border, and American soldiers reside permanently in Norwegian military camps. 
This too will evidently be felt as a “threat” on the Russian side.
Even if I am not convinced by the author’s arguments and conclusions, it is nev-
ertheless interesting to review these experiences from the perspective of a prominent 
partner – and leader – of Soviet/Russian negotiating teams, and therefore the book 
is strongly recommended. In addition, it includes many illustrations and statistics of 
interest.
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